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Abstract
Under approval voting, every voter may vote for any number of candi-
dates. To model approval voting, we let a political spectrum be the set of
all possible political positions, and let each voter have a subset of the spec-
trum that they approve, called an approval region. The fraction of all vot-
ers who approve the most popular position is the agreement proportion for
the society. We consider voting in societies whose political spectrum is
modeled by d-dimensional space (Rd) with approval regions defined by
axis-parallel boxes. For such societies, we first consider a Turán-type prob-
lem, attempting to find the maximum agreement between pairs of voters
for a society with a given level of overall agreement. We prove a lower
bound on this maximum agreement and find in the literature a proof that
the lower bound is optimal. By this result we find that for sufficiently large
n, any n-voter box society in Rd where at least α(n2) pairs of voters agree
on some position must have a position contained in βn approval regions,
where α = 1 − (1 − β)2/d. We also consider an extension of this prob-
lem involving projections of approval regions to axes. Finally we consider
the question of (k, m)-agreeable box societies, where a society is said to be
(k, m)-agreeable if among every m voters, some k approve a common posi-
tion. In the m = 2k− 1 case, we use methods from graph theory to prove
that the agreement proportion is at least 1/(2d) for any integer k ≥ 2.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We consider voting in elections, where each candidate must select a set of
positions on various issues to be their platform. The set of all possible plat-
forms is the political spectrum. Many different geometric spaces can arise as
political spectra, such as the real line (Berg et al., 2010) or a circle (Carlson
et al., 2011).
In this thesis we model the political spectrum byRd. A simple interpre-
tation of this model is that each dimension represents a separate issue upon
which any voter can have any opinion. The standard example in contempo-
rary American politics uses d = 1, modeling political positions as points on
the real line, ranging from liberal to conservative. Some two dimensional
models have also been created, such as the one seen in Figure 1.1, which
splits preferences into opinions on governmental control (statism vs. an-
archy) and egalitarianism (left vs. right) (Bryson and McDill, 1968). This
model is closely related to the Nolan chart, named for Libertarian party
founder David Nolan, and provides validation that “libertarianism seem[s]
to have a place” because political ideology was complicated “beyond just
left and right” (Doherty, 2007). Such splitting of issues could be carried out
endlessly to better capture the diversity of potential political positions, with
Rd representing a political spectrum where each platform corresponds to a
distinct position on each of d different questions.
With a given political spectrum, an election can be modeled by con-
sidering a society of voters where each voter has a unique approval region,
consisting of the set of platforms of which the voter approves. In an ap-
proval voting system, where each voter votes for or against each candidate
individually, any candidate taking a position in a voter’s approval region
would expect to receive that voter’s vote. One example of a society in R2
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Figure 1.1 A two-dimensional political spectrum proposed by Bryson and
McDill (1968).
is shown in Figure 1.2, where each voter’s approval region is drawn in a
different color. Note that two approval regions consist of two disconnected
components.
A common question about such societies is whether there is a platform
that is approved of by a particular number or percentage of voters. In other
words, is there a point contained in a given number of approval regions?
Many of these ideas are first explored by Berg et al. (2010). To deal with this
question, we define the agreement proportion of a society to be the number of
voters who approve of the most popular platform in the spectrum divided
by the total number of voters. In other words, the agreement proportion
is the maximum fraction of the population that approves a particular plat-
form.
The usual goal when studying such models is to determine conditions
that guarantee a known minimal agreement proportion, so that, for exam-
ple, a candidate in a society with those conditions would know she could
position herself somewhere and receive a certain percentage of voter ap-
proval. We say that such questions deal with the agreeability of the society.
The conditions placed on societies usually deal with the shape and distri-
bution of approval regions.
In principle, approval regions could be any subset of the spectrum, but
to achieve any meaningful agreeability results, and to model rational vot-
ers, some restrictions are generally placed on approval regions. One obvi-
ous restriction is that approval regions should be convex, corresponding to
3Figure 1.2 A five-voter society in R2.
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Figure 1.3 Convex and nonconvex approval regions. The lines show compro-
mise platforms between approved platforms A and B.
the idea that a voter must approve of any platform that is a compromise
between two approved platforms, as seen in Figure 1.3. Another possi-
ble restriction for the spectrum Rd is that approval regions must be boxes,
here defined as the Cartesian product of d intervals in R. Such a restric-
tion would correspond to the idea that each axis is an independent issue
upon which a voter must approve a particular set of positions, with the
overall approval region being simply the set of points for which all of those
individual positions are satisfied. We will briefly consider general convex
societies but focus mostly on box societies.
To establish most results about agreeability, it is also necessary to for-
mulate a hypothesis about the distribution of approval regions. That is,
some conditions must be placed on the voters which will then imply that
the society has some minimal agreement proportion. We will consider two
different sorts of distribution hypotheses.
4 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we connect the voting problems described above to graph
theory and develop terminology for discussing graphs and societies.
In Chapter 3 we introduce one distribution condition to place on soci-
eties, based on the percentage of pairwise intersections of approval regions
that are nonempty. We explore a Turán-type question that this condition
generates briefly for general convex societies and more thoroughly for box
societies. The result for box societies, which already existed in the litera-
ture, is in Theorem 3.3.
In Chapter 4 we consider an extension of the Turán-type question, where
we consider the pairwise-agreement proportion of projections of box soci-
eties onto the coordinate axes, rather than in Rd itself. Our main result for
this chapter is in Theorem 4.2.
In Chapter 5 we suggest a different distribution condition that looks at
intersections of subsets of voters, and extend known results to new cases.
The extended result is in Theorem 5.7
In Chapter 6 we consider possible future directions for research on vot-
ing in box societies in Rd.
Chapter 2
Connecting to Graph Theory
To transform a problem about voter approval into a problem about graphs,
we need to create graphs that correspond to societies. First we define a
society to be a political spectrum together with a set of approval regions
representing the voters, where each approval region is a subset of the spec-
trum. We let a convex society be a society in which all approval regions are
convex, and let a box society be a society in which all approval regions are
boxes.
Now the natural way to construct a graph to represent a society is to
simply consider the intersection graph corresponding to a set of regions
{Ai} in Rd, where each vertex vi corresponds to a region Ai and the edge
vivj is in the graph if and only if Ai ∩ Aj 6= ∅. An example of such a graph
appears in Figure 2.1.
In this chapter, we explore this connection to graph theory, consider-
ing the Helly property and its relation to convex and box societies. We also
establish some terminology, useful concepts, and basic results of graph the-
ory.
2.1 Graph Terminology
Because we are using intersection graphs, we need only consider simple
graphs, with no loops, multiple edges, or directed edges. Unless otherwise
specified, G will refer to such a graph, with vertex set V(G) and edge set
E(G). We let n = |V(G)| be the number of vertices and e(G) = |E(G)| be
the number of edges in the graph G. Given a subset W of V(G), let G[W] be
the subgraph induced by W, with vertex set W and all edges in E(G) with
both endpoints in W.
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Figure 2.1 A set of approval regions in R2 and corresponding intersection
graph.
For any vertex v ∈ V(G), the degree of v, denoted deg(v), is the number
of edges incident to v. A clique in G is a subset of vertices that induces a
complete subgraph. We denote the size of the largest clique in G by ω(G),
the clique number of G.
2.2 The Helly Property and Convex Approval Regions
To analyze mutual intersections of approval regions, we want to find a fea-
ture of the intersection graph that corresponds to such intersections. Un-
fortunately, as seen in Figure 2.2, two sets of convex approval regions may
have the same intersection graph despite one having a mutual intersection
of more regions. This corresponds to the idea that collections of convex sets
in Rd have Helly number d + 1. We define a family of sets B to have Helly
number h if for a finite subfamily F ⊆ B in which every h or fewer sets of
F have a common point, then ⋂F 6= ∅ (Matoušek, 2002).
Thus Helly’s theorem only refers to pairwise intersections for d = 1,
and we see that for d > 1, sets of pairwise intersecting regions do not neces-
sarily have a point in all sets. Since intersection graphs only record pairwise
intersections, they are not useful in analyzing general convex approval re-
gions. Because we are primarily interested in pairwise intersections, we
will say that a family of sets has the Helly property if it has Helly number 2.
The Helly Property and Convex Approval Regions 7
Figure 2.2 Two different sets of convex approval regions with the same inter-
section graph. Note that one set has an intersection of three regions while the
other does not.
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2.3 The Helly Property and Box Societies
We therefore consider box societies. To see the advantage provided by
boxes, we first note that
Lemma 2.1. A point x = (x1, . . . , xd) is in B =
⋂k
i=1 Bi for boxes
Bi = (ai1, bi1)× · · · × (aid, bid)
if and only if
aij < xi < bij
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d and 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Proof. Clearly if aij < xi < bij for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d and 1 ≤ i ≤ k, then x ∈ B.
Furthermore, if there exist i′ and j′ such that 1 ≤ j′ ≤ d and 1 ≤ i′ ≤ k such
that xi′ ≤ ai′ j′ or xi′ ≥ bi′ j′ , then x 6∈ Bi′ , and so x 6∈ B.
Lemma 2.1 allows us to prove
Theorem 2.1. Boxes in Rd have the Helly property. That is, any set of boxes for
which every pair intersects must contain a point in all boxes.
Proof. We first recall that intervals on the real line have the Helly property,
so any set of intervals for which every pair intersects contains a point in all
intervals. Now consider a set X of pairwise intersecting boxes inRd and let
Xi be the set of projections from those intervals to the xi-axis for 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
By Lemma 2.1, Xi is a set of pairwise intersecting intervals, which therefore
has a point xi in all intervals. By the other direction of Lemma 2.1, the point
x = (x1, . . . , xd) is in the intersection of all the boxes of X.
Theorem 2.1 implies that any set of k pairwise intersecting vertices (a
clique of size k) in the intersection graph for a box society corresponds to
a nonempty mutual intersection of k approval regions. Therefore results
about clique size of intersection graphs can be directly translated to results
about mutual intersections of approval regions.
2.4 Boxicity
One other concept is important for connecting box societies to intersection
graphs, allowing any simple graph to be interpreted as a box society in
Rd for some d > 1. This idea, developed by Roberts (1969), is the boxicity
Boxicity 9
Figure 2.3 A graph with corresponding collections of boxes in R2 and R1.
of a graph G, which is the minimum dimension necessary to construct a
collection of boxes with intersection graph G.
For example, the graph G in Figure 2.3 is shown with a collection of
boxes inR2 and a collection of intervals inR, both of which have G as their
intersection graph. Thus G has boxicity at most 1. By convention, the only
graph with n vertices of boxicity 0 is the complete graph Kn, which can be
represented by n copies of a single point (a box in R0).
Roberts (1969) shows that every graph has finite boxicity, so we let
box(G) denote the boxicity of the graph G.

Chapter 3
A Turán-type Problem
In this chapter, we build on Carlson et al. (2011) and Abbott and Katchal-
ski (1979), considering pairwise intersections of approval regions, trying
to determine a fraction of such intersections that will guarantee a position
approved by some number of the voters. We define the pairwise-agreement
proportion of a society to be the number of pairs of voters with intersecting
approval regions divided by the total number of pairs of voters.
The question leads us to a consideration of Turán’s Theorem, a result
of extremal graph theory. Using insight from that theorem, we develop
a graph of fixed boxicity that attempts to maximize the number of edges
while maintaining a given maximum clique size. We then find that this
graph already exists in the literature and is proven to be maximal, provid-
ing a relationship between agreement proportion and pairwise-agreement
proportion.
3.1 The Question
Given the concept of pairwise-agreement proportion, our question can be
formulated as
Question 1. What is the minimal value α ∈ [0, 1] for a given β ∈ (0, 1] such
that any n-voter society in Rd in which at least α(n2) of the pairwise intersections
of approval regions are nonempty must have a platform contained in βn approval
regions, for sufficiently large n?
We note briefly that this question is trivial for general convex approval
regions inRd, using a construction suggested by the top set of three regions
in Figure 2.2 that demonstrates an arbitrary collection of n convex voter
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approval regions need have no point in more than two regions, even if all
regions pairwise intersect.
In loose terms, we can construct a society in R2 where each approval
region is a rotated box that is sufficiently large in one dimension and suf-
ficiently small in the other that each region approximates a line. Simply
rotating each region to a different angle and translating them appropriately
to avoid triple intersections, we can construct a society with (n2) nonempty
pairwise intersections for which every platform is in at most 2 approval re-
gions. Such a construction can clearly be extended to Rd simply by adding
size in extra dimensions.
From this construction we see that we cannot achieve a Turán-type re-
sult stronger than the trivial statement that a single pairwise intersection
indicates there is a point contained in two sets, so we turn our attention to
box societies.
By Chapter 2, we see that Question 1 for box societies can be reconfig-
ured as
Question 2. What is the minimal value α ∈ [0, 1] for a given β ∈ (0, 1] such that
any n-vertex graph G with boxicity at most d and at least α(n2) edges must contain
a clique of size βn, for sufficiently large n?
Such an approach is analogous to Turán’s theorem, a result of graph
theory that states that any graph with a certain number of edges must have
a complete graph of a given size as a subgraph. Abbott and Katchalski
(1979) consider the question for interval graphs, which corresponds to the
case d = 1 in Question 1. Notice that in R convex sets and boxes are both
just intervals. Thus their answer to Question 1,
α = 1− (1− β)2, (3.1)
applies to any linear society with convex approval regions. Carlson et al.
(2011) prove a similar result for a circular political spectrum. The analogy
between Question 1 and Turán’s theorem suggests that a full understand-
ing of Turán’s Theorem and its proof may be helpful for answering Ques-
tion 1.
3.2 Turán’s Theorem
This theorem deals with maximizing the number of edges in a graph with
n vertices without creating a clique of size r+ 1. Recall that a k-partite graph
is a graph whose vertices can be partitioned into k independent sets, where
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an independent set is a set of vertices with no edges. Define the complete
k-partite graph Kn1,...,nk to be the graph that can be partitioned into k inde-
pendent sets of size n1, . . . , nk, respectively, such that all vertices in different
independent sets are adjoined by an edge. We now define the Turán graph
Tn,r to be the complete r-partite graph with n vertices whose partite sets
differ in size by at most 1. If we define a = bn/rc and b = n− ra, Tn,r has b
partite sets of size a + 1 and r− b partite sets of size a (West, 2001).
With these definitions established, Turán’s theorem states that
Theorem 3.1. Among n vertex graphs with no clique of size r + 1, Tn,r has the
most edges. In other words, any n vertex graph with more edges than Tn,r must
contain a clique of size r + 1.
Turán proved this result in 1941. The proof given here comes from West
(2001).
Proof. First notice that no r-partite graph can contain an (r+ 1)-clique, since
all members of a clique must be put into different partite sets of any par-
tition into independent sets. Further notice that among r-partite graphs,
complete r-partite graphs maximize the number of edges, as any r-partite
graph that is not complete can have edges added between partite sets while
remaining r-partite.
We now show that among r-partite graphs with n vertices, Tn,r has the
most edges. By the above we need only consider complete r-partite graphs,
so we consider a complete r-partite graph with two partite sets of sizes i
and j such that i > j + 1. Then we can move a vertex v from the set X of
size i to the set Y of size j, which requires deleting the j edges between v
and the members of Y and adding i− 1 edges between v and the members
of X. The other edges remain the same. Therefore there is a net addition of
i − 1− j > 0 edges, and the partite sets have moved closer to differing in
size by at most 1. Therefore the number of edges is maximized by Tn,r.
It only remains to be shown that for any graph G with no clique of size
r + 1 there is an r-partite graph H with the same vertex set and at least as
many edges. We proceed by induction on r.
For r = 1, any graph with no clique of size r + 1 = 2 has no edges,
so G and H are the same graph. Now suppose the result holds for r − 1,
and consider G with no (r + 1)-clique. Let x be a vertex of G with degree
k, where k is the maximum degree of any vertex in G. Then let G′ be the
subgraph induced by all the vertices adjacent to x. Since an r-clique in G′
would have all its members adjacent to x in G and create an (r + 1)-clique
in G, G′ has no r-clique. By the induction hypothesis, there exists some
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(r− 1)-partite graph H′ on the same vertex set as G′ with at least as many
edges as G′.
Now form H by joining the vertices of H′ to the set of vertices S in G
but not in G′. That is, add an edge between every vertex of H′ and every
vertex of S, preserving the edges in H′ but not any edges between members
of S. Since H′ is (r− 1)-partite and S is an independent set, H is r-partite.
We will show that H has at least as many edges as H.
Notice that by construction e(H) = e(H′) + k(n− k) and e(H′) ≥ e(G′).
Notice that
e(G) ≤ e(G′) + ∑
v∈S
dG(v),
where dG(v) is the degree of v in G, since the edges in G but not in G′ are
all counted at least once by the sum. Because k is the maximum degree of
G, we have dG(v) ≤ k for v ∈ S and |S| = n− k, so we have
e(G) ≤ e(G′) + (n− k)k ≤ e(H′) + k(n− k) = e(H),
as desired.
Notice that if Tn,βn−1 has boxicity at most d, Turán’s theorem states that
it maximizes the edges being counted in Question 2, so it is important to un-
derstand the boxicity of the Turán graph. Luckily the boxicity of complete
k-partite graphs is well known, with Roberts (1969: Theorem 7) proving
Lemma 3.1. The boxicity of the complete k-partite graph Kn1,...,nk is equal to the
number of the ni that are strictly greater than 1.
Proof. Let d be the number of ni that are strictly greater than 1.
Since we are here concerned only with graphs with known upper bounds
on their boxicity, we will only prove that the boxicity of Kn1,...,nk it at most
d. We refer to Roberts (1969) for the proof that d is the precise boxicity.
To prove box(Kn1,...,nk) ≤ d it suffices to construct a set of boxes in Rd
with intersection graph Kn1,...,nk . To do this, we first notice that any partite
set of size ni = 1 consists of a vertex adjacent to all other vertices, and so
can be represented by a copy of Rd, or alternately a box large enough to
encompass all other boxes. Therefore any number of partite sets of size 1
can be accounted for, leaving only the d sets of size greater than 1.
Since we are creating boxes in Rd, we can simply assign one direction
to each of these d partite sets and separate the members of the set in the
assigned direction. Each box can be made arbitrarily large in all other di-
rections so as to intersect all boxes not part of its partite set. An example of
this construction is shown in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1 A family of boxes in R2 with intersection graph K4,4,1,1,1.
Since Tn,r is a complete r-partite graph with partite set sizes all near nr ,
this result implies that for large n and r > d the boxicity of the Turán graph
will be greater than d, and so the maximal graph of boxicity at most d will
have fewer edges than Tn,r.
We now use these insights from graph theory to find a lower bound on
the maximal pairwise-agreement proportion for a given agreement propor-
tion.
3.3 Lower Bound on Maximal Pairwise-Agreement Pro-
portion
In this section we establish for Question 2 the lower bound
α ≥ 1− (1− β)
2
d
(3.2)
for the maximal pairwise-agreement proportion α for a given agreement
proportion β. To do this, we construct a graph G with n vertices, boxicity
at most d, such that it does not contain a clique of size r+ 1, trying to maxi-
mize the number of edges m. This can be converted into the large-n case by
setting r + 1 = βn and m ≤ α(n2) and then considering the limit of m/(n2) as
n goes to infinity.
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3.3.1 Constructing a Turán-like Graph
Recalling Turán’s theorem (Theorem 3.1) and Lemma 3.1, we consider com-
plete r-partite graphs as likely candidates to maximize the number of edges
among boxicity d graphs with no clique of size r+ 1. Such graphs are espe-
cially convenient to study because their boxicity is well known.
To determine how the vertices should be distributed among the r partite
sets, we recall from Lemma 3.1 that at most d of the sets can have size
greater than 1. If r ≤ d, any complete r-partite graph has boxicity at most d,
so the number of edges is maximized by the Turán graph Tn,r. For r > d, we
let r− d of the partite sets have size 1. This leaves n− (r− d) vertices to be
distributed among d partite sets. Turán’s theorem implies that the number
of edges among those vertices is maximized by allowing the sizes of the
sets to vary by at most 1. This gives us a complete construction of a graph,
which can be achieved most simply by joining the Turán graph Tn−(r−d),d
with the complete graph Kr−d.
By the join of two graphs G and H we mean the graph achieved by
including all the edges of G and H, and adding an edge from each vertex
of G to every vertex of H. We define
Definition 3.1. For given n, r, and d, let Tn,r,d be defined as the Turán graph Tn,r
for r ≤ d and the join of Tn−(r−d),d and Kr−d for r > d. We call this graph the
Turán-like graph of boxicity d.
Notice that Tn,r,d is uniquely defined because the Turán graph itself is.
We can now prove
Lemma 3.2. Among complete r-partite graphs with n vertices of boxicity at most
d, the Turán-like graph Tn,r,d maximizes the number of edges.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1, any complete r-partite graph of boxicity at most d has
at most d partite sets of size greater than 1. If d ≥ r, the Turán-like graph is
the Turán graph, and is therefore maximal by Theorem 3.1.
Suppose d < r. Then in any complete r-partite graph with boxicity
at most d, there are b universal vertices (vertices adjacent to every other
point in the graph) for some 0 ≤ b ≤ r − d. The remaining n− b vertices
are distributed into d partite sets, a process in which the number of edges is
maximized by the Turán graph T(n− b, r). Suppose b < r− d, and consider
a vertex v in a partite set of size k > 1. Notice that turning v into a universal
vertex only involves adding k− 1 > 0 edges, so increasing b increases the
number of edges in the graph. Thus the number of edges is maximized for
b = r− d, which gives precisely the definition of the Turán-like graph.
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Figure 3.2 The graph T5,2,2 and a corresponding society.
Thus for n vertices, maximum boxicity d, and maximum clique size r,
we consider the Turán-like graph Tn,r,d. Before counting the edges in this
graph, we consider a few examples.
3.3.2 Examples and Alternate Constructions
To get a better sense for the structure of Tn,r,d, and how to interpret the so-
cieties it represents, we consider a few examples inR2. We can, in all cases,
use the construction from the proof of Lemma 3.1 to get a society whose
intersection graph is Tn,r,d. Figure 3.2 shows T5,2,2 along with a correspond-
ing society. Notice that T5,2 = K3,2 has boxicity 2, so T5,2,2 = T5,2. Figure 3.3
shows T8,3,2, which has one universal vertex.
At this point we consider the uniqueness of the pairwise-agreement
proportion achieved by Tn,r,d. In the case r ≤ d, then Tn,r,d is simply the
Turán graph Tn,r, which is the unique n-vertex graph with no (r+ 1)-clique
that maximizes the number of edges, but no such result limits the r > d
case. It then becomes of interest to try to find an example of a family of
boxes which matches the upper bound given by Tn,r,d with a different in-
tersection graph.
We find that we can construct an example for n = 8, r = 3, d = 2.
Figure 3.3 shows T8,3,2, which has 19 edges. Figure 3.4 shows another eight-
voter society with a 19-edge intersection graph. This graph is clearly not
isomorphic to T8,3,2, as it does not have a vertex of degree 7.
One other thing that may be interesting to consider is the case d = 1,
and what the Turán-like graph looks like in that case. Figure 3.5 shows the
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Figure 3.3 The graph T8,3,2 and a corresponding society.
Figure 3.4 An alternate construction to achieve the pairwise agreement of
T8,3,2.
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Figure 3.5 The graph T9,3,1 and a corresponding society.
graph T9,3,1 and representative intervals (the intervals are separated so as
to be visible). Notice that this graph is just Kn−(r−d),1,...,1, where there are
r − d 1’s, which can also be thought of as the complete graph Kr−d joined
with an independent set of size n− (r− d).
3.3.3 Counting the Edges of the Turán-like Graph
We now use the Turán-like graph to prove
Theorem 3.2. Given agreement proportion β ∈ (0, 1], the minimal pairwise-
agreement proportion α ∈ [0, 1] such that any n-vertex graph G with boxicity at
most d and at least α(n2) edges must contain a clique of size βn satisfies
α ≥ 1− (1− β)
2
d
,
for sufficiently large n.
Notice that this bound is the best possible in the case d = 1 by Abbott
and Katchalski (1979).
Proof. We use that the Turán-like graph Tn,βn−1,d to construct a family of
n-vertex graphs with agreement proportion
1− (1− β)
2
d
in the limit n → ∞. By the construction of Tn,r,d, such graphs have box-
icity at most d and do not contain a clique of size βn. This construction
establishes the lower bound on α.
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We will use the degree-sum formula to compute the number of edges m
of the graph Tn,r,d. Note that each vertex in a partite set of size x has degree
n− x, so
2m = (r− d)(n− 1) +
d
∑
i=1
ni(n− ni), (3.3)
where ni is the size of the ith partite set of Tn,r,d.
Since we have defined Tn,r,d so that its first d partite sets correspond to
the Turán graph Tn−(r−d),d, we notice
d
∑
i=1
ni(n− ni) = 2e(Tn−r+d,d).
Plugging this back in to Equation 3.3 gives
2m = (r− d)(n− 1) + 2e(Tn−r+d,d). (3.4)
We define
a =
⌊
n− r + d
d
⌋
(3.5)
and
b = (n− r + d)− da (3.6)
so Tn,r,d has b partite sets of size a + 1 and d− b partite sets of size a along
with its r− d partite sets of size 1. We therefore have
2m = (r− d)(n− 1) + b(a + 1)(n− (a + 1)) + (d− b)a(n− a)
= (r− d)(n− 1) + adn + bn− a2d− 2ab− b. (3.7)
Substituting Equation 3.6 into Equation 3.7 gives
2m = n2 + a2d− 2an + 2ar− n− ad, (3.8)
and using Equation 3.5 gives
2m = n2 +
⌊
n− r + d
d
⌋2
d +
⌊
n− r + d
d
⌋
(2r− 2n− d)− n. (3.9)
At this point we set r = βn− 1 to find
m =
1
2
(
n(n− 1) +
⌊
n(1− β) + 1+ d
d
⌋2
d
−
⌊
n(1− β) + 1+ d
d
⌋
(2n(1− β) + 2+ d)
)
. (3.10)
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In the limit as n→ ∞, the n2 terms dominate in both m and(
n
2
)
=
n(n− 1)
2
,
so we have
α ≥ lim
n→∞
m
(n2)
= lim
n→∞
(
2
n2
)(
1
2
)(
n2 + d
(
n(1− β)
d
)2
−
(
2n2(1− β)2
d
))
= 1− (1− β)
2
d
, (3.11)
as desired.
3.4 Attempts to Prove an Upper Bound on Pairwise-
Agreement Proportion
Since we found in Theorem 3.2 that the Turán-like graph Tn,r,d provides a
pairwise-agreement proportion that matches the maximal value proved by
Abbott and Katchalski (1979) for d = 1, we attempt to prove that it is also
maximal for the d > 1 case.
Because the methods of Abbott and Katchalski (1979) involve structural
features of interval graphs and no analogs for boxicity at most d graphs are
known, we attempt to modify a proof of Turán’s theorem to show that Tn,r,d
has the maximum number of edges among n-vertex graphs of boxicity d
with no clique of size r + 1.
Lemma 3.2 proves that Tn,r,d maximizes the number of edges among
complete r-partite graphs, so following the proof of Turán’s theorem pre-
sented in Section 3.2 it only remains to show that the maximum is achieved
by a complete r-partite graph.
That step can be broken down into two parts: Proving that for any r-
partite graph with boxicity at most d, there is a complete r-partite graph
with boxicity at most d and at least as many edges and proving that for any
graph with boxicity at most d and no clique of size r+ 1 there is an r-partite
graph with boxicity at most d and at least as many edges.
Maintaining the boxicity requirement proves to be problematic for both
parts, and straightforward adaptations of the arguments presented in Sec-
tion 3.2 are insufficient.
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3.5 The Existing Answer
While searching for a way to prove the maximality of the Turán-like graph,
we found that Eckhoff (1988) proves
Theorem 3.3 (Eckhoff). Any collection of n boxes inRd in which at least α(n2) of
the pairwise intersections are nonempty must have a point contained in βn boxes,
where
α = 1− (1− β)
2
d
,
for sufficiently large n.
This theorem was originally conjectured by Kalai (1984). Both Kalai and
Eckhoff (1988) use the family of boxes discussed in Section 3.3, which we
discovered independently. Eckhoff also mentions the intersection graph of
these families, which we have defined as Tn,r,d. He uses geometric methods
to prove Theorem 3.3, and extends the result to the claim that families of
boxes corresponding to Tn,r,d maximize the number of cliques of size k for
all 2 ≤ k ≤ r. Eckhoff (1991) also characterizes the families of boxes that
achieve the maximal pairwise-agreement proportion.
After discovering Theorem 3.3, we began to consider extensions and
variants of the question.
Chapter 4
Projections to Axes
The voting context suggests a variant of the Turán-type problem posed by
Questions 1 and 2, where instead of considering pairwise intersections of
approval regions, we consider projections of the approval regions onto each
of the coordinate axes in Rd. This corresponds to the idea of looking for
agreement between pairs of voters on the individual questions or issues
represented by the axes. In other words, if we know the pairwise agree-
ment on each issue, what does it tell us about the agreement for the society
as a whole?
In this chapter we construct a family of societies that maximizes the
pairwise agreement of projections for a given agreement proportion.
4.1 Considering Agreement on Projections
Given a family of boxes in Rd, it is simple to construct d families of inter-
vals on the real line, where each family corresponds to one direction. By
Lemma 2.1, two boxes intersect in Rd if and only if their corresponding in-
tervals intersect in each of the d families of intervals. An example of a box
society in R2 and its corresponding linear societies is shown in Figure 4.1.
To simplify notation, when referring to projections of a society S in Rd
to the coordinate axes, we define αi(S) for 1 ≤ i ≤ d to be the fraction of
the possible pairwise intersections that are nonempty in the projection to
the xi-axis. Notice that, unlike the value α in Question 1, these values refer
to specific societies, rather than families of societies. When the society in
question is obvious from context, we will omit the argument S.
When dealing with R2, we will consider α1 to refer to projection to the
x-axis and α2 to refer to projection to the y-axis. As an example, notice that
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Figure 4.1 A box society in R2 with corresponding projections.
in Figure 4.1, α1 = 2/3 and α2 = 9/15.
An initial question that we might ask about this situation is what con-
ditions we should place on agreement in the projections to even guarantee
that any boxes overlap in the overall society. To answer this question, we
construct societies in R2 with no nonempty intersections, trying to maxi-
mize the intersection in the projections. One natural construction to con-
sider is shown in Figure 4.2. The idea of this construction is to split the
approval regions into two sets and assign one as vertical sets and the other
as horizontal. The horizontal sets are then spaced in the y direction, with
identical x endpoints, and the vertical sets are placed above the horizontal
ones in y, then spaced from each other in x.
As can be seen, all horizontal boxes intersect each other in the x pro-
jection and all vertical boxes intersect each other in the y projection. Fur-
thermore, each vertical box intersects all the horizontal boxes in the x pro-
jection, but the horizontal boxes have no intersections in the y projection.
If we count the total number of nonempty intersections in each projection
(in Figure 4.2), we find that there are six in the y-projection and 22 in the x-
projection. Since there are a total of eight boxes, each projection could have
up to 28 intersections, so we have α1 = 11/14 and α2 = 3/14. Immediately
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Figure 4.2 A box society with no agreement but high pairwise agreement in
corresponding projections.
we notice that α1 + α2 = 1. Furthermore, we notice that this sum would be
the same regardless of how many boxes we included in this construction,
or how they were distributed, because of the relationships
α1
(
n
2
)
=
(
n
2
)
−
(
nv
2
)
and
α2
(
n
2
)
=
(
nv
2
)
,
where nv is the number of boxes chosen to be vertical. Then α1 + α2 = 1
for any version of this construction in R2. This, along with the lack of ob-
vious ways to increase the sum without introducing intersections between
the boxes in R2, suggests that 1 may be an upper bound for the sum. We
therefore consider
Question 3. For box societies in Rd with no agreement, what is the maximum
value of the sum ∑ αi of the pairwise-agreement proportions of the projections?
We attempt to address this question in the next section.
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Figure 4.3 A box society with projections and intersection graphs.
4.2 Intersection Graphs of Projections
Considering the projections of a box society as linear societies, we can
understand their intersection graphs exactly as we did in Chapter 2. Of
course, since the societies in question have intervals in R as approval re-
gions, the resulting graphs will have boxicity at most 1, making them inter-
val graphs.
As we have already observed, two boxes intersect in Rd if and only
if the corresponding intervals intersect in each of the d projections, so an
edge exists on the intersection graph for a society if and only if it exists on
the intersection graphs for each projection. In other words, the intersection
graph for a society is the intersection of the projection graphs, where we
consider the intersection of graphs Gi on the same vertex set to be the graph
G on that vertex set such that two vertices are adjacent in G if and only if
they are adjacent in each of the Gi. An example of a society in R2 and its
projections, with corresponding graphs, is shown in Figure 4.3.
Conceiving of projections as interval graphs also evokes an alternate
definition of boxicity, mentioned by Roberts (1969), who points out that
a graph is representable as the intersection graph of boxes in Rd if and
only if it is the intersection of d interval graphs. The boxicity of a graph G
can then be defined as the smallest number of interval graphs Gi necessary
to represent G as their intersection. This definition provides a significant
advantage to the graph approach to projections, as studying d > 2 now
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only requires considering more interval graphs, rather than constructing
families of boxes in Rd.
To answer Question 3 for d = 2, notice that (n2)(α1 + α2) is the total num-
ber of edges among the two interval graphs, so α1 + α2 = 1 corresponds to
there being exactly (n2) edges in the two graphs. By the pigeonhole prin-
ciple, if there are more than (n2) edges in the two graphs, some edge must
exist in both graphs. That is, there must be some pair of vertices that are
adjacent in both graphs. Such a pair must also be in the intersection of the
two graphs, indicating an intersection of boxes inR2. Thus we have proved
the conjecture that α1 + α2 = 1 is maximal for the d = 2 case, and suggests
that we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. Any box society in Rd whose projection to the xi axis has pairwise
agreement αi such that
d
∑
i=1
αi > d− 1
must have at least one nonempty intersection between approval regions.
Proof. Let G be the intersection graph for such a society, let Gi be the inter-
section graph for the projection to the xi axis, and let n be the number of
voters in the society. Then the number of edges in Gi is e(Gi) = αi(n2), so
d
∑
i=1
αi > d− 1
implies
d
∑
i=1
e(Gi) > (d− 1)
(
n
2
)
.
These edges must be distributed between the d graphs Gi, each of which has
only (n2) pairs of vertices. Thus there must be some pair of vertices that are
adjacent in all Gi. That pair of vertices is also adjacent in G, corresponding
to a nonempty intersection of approval regions.
Notice that this bound is sharp, as a society in which all approval re-
gions are copies of Rd−1 translated in one direction has ∑ αi = d− 1 with
no intersections in Rd.
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Figure 4.4 A society with intersection graph T11,5,2 and its projections.
4.3 A Turán-like Result for Projections
We now return to the original purpose of the chapter, which is to answer an
analog of Question 1 where we count the pairwise-agreement proportion
in the projections to axes rather than in the society as a whole. The natural
place to start for such a question is the Turán-like graph defined in Chap-
ter 3, since by Theorem 3.3 this graph maximizes the number of overall
edges.
We consider a typical example of Tn,r,d, and attempt to characterize its
projections. Figure 4.4 shows a society whose intersection graph is T11,5,2.
Notice that the projections both have an intersection graph which is the
join of K8 and an independent set of size 4. Further note that the indepen-
dent sets of size 4 correspond to different vertices in each projection graph.
We also observe that the intervals of the projection are strongly evocative
of Figure 3.5, which is not unexpected considering that figure showed a
Turán-like graph for d = 1.
Given the standard society we use to correspond to Tn,r,d, we expect
that the projection graphs will always have a similar structure, and a con-
sideration of the graph Tn,r,d as an intersection of d interval graph confirms
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this. If we let the ith largest partite sets of Tn,r,d have size ni for 1 ≤ i ≤ d
and define Hi to be Kn−ni joined with an independent set Si of size ni and
identify the vertices of the Si such that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for i 6= j, then the in-
tersection H of all the Hi will be Tn,r,d. Clearly every edge not between
two vertices in the same Si will exist in H, and no edges between two such
vertices will, so the resulting graph will be Kn1,...,nd,1,...,1, where there are
n−∑ ni = n− (n− (r− d)) = r− d partite sets of size 1. This is of course
Tn,r,d.
With this construction of Tn,r,d by the intersection of Gi, we prove
Theorem 4.2. Among graphs with n vertices and no clique of size r + 1 that
are the intersection of d interval graphs G1, . . . , Gd, the Turán-like graph Tn,r,d
constructed by the intersection of the graphs Hi above, maximizes the total number
of edges in G1, . . . , Gd.
Proof. Because Tn,r,d can be constructed by intersecting the interval graphs
Hi defined above, and by Theorem 3.3 Tn,r,d has the maximum number of
edges among graphs of boxicity at most d with n vertices and no clique
of size r + 1, we need only prove that any collection of d interval graphs
Gi with more edges than the collection Hi must have an intersection with
more edges than Tn,r,d.
Let x = (n2) − e(Tn,r,d) be the number of nonadjacent vertex pairs in
Tn,r,d (i.e., the number of nonedges). Notice that by the construction of the
Hi, the total number of edges missing from the Hi is also x, since every
nonedge of Tn,r,d is a nonedge in precisely one of the Hi (corresponding to
whichever partite set the nonadjacent vertices are in). Further notice that
given a collection of interval graphs Gi, a pair of vertices is nonadjacent in
their intersection only if it is nonadjacent in at least one Gi. Therefore any
collection of graphs with at most x − 1 nonedges among the Gi can have
at most x − 1 nonedges in the intersection, so no collection Gi can have
more total edges than Hi without having more edges in the intersection
than Tn,r,d.

Chapter 5
(k, m)-Agreeability
For any society of voters, say that some subset of voters agree on a position if
it is in all of their approval regions. Berg et al. (2010) introduce the concept
of (k, m)-agreeability, where a society is (k, m)-agreeable if it has at least m
voters, and among every m voters some subset of k voters agree on some
position. Similarly, a graph with at least m vertices is said to be (k, m)-
agreeable if every induced subgraph with m vertices contains a clique of
size k.
In this chapter, we will consider the minimal agreement proportion for
(k, m)-agreeable societies. For box societies in Rd we adopt the notation
of Abrahams et al. (2010) to denote this minimal agreement proportion
β(k, m, d). Notice that this notation is analogous to that of Question 1, with
the condition on the fraction of nonempty pairwise intersections replaced
by the new (k, m)-agreeability condition.
After reviewing previous work on this question, we extend in Theo-
rem 5.7 a result of Abrahams et al. (2010) to prove for k ≥ 2 the lower
bound
β(k, 2k− 1, d) ≥ (2d)−1. (5.1)
Note that due to the definition of (k, m)-agreeability, throughout the
chapter we will assume k ≥ 2, and m ≥ k. Since the only boxicity zero
graphs are the complete graphs Kn (which always have agreement propor-
tion 1), we also assume d ≥ 1.
5.1 Previous Work
Berg et al. (2010) extensively study the d = 1 case; that is, linear (k, m)-
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agreeable societies, proving that for 2 ≤ k ≤ m,
β(k, m, 1) ≥ k− 1
m− 1. (5.2)
The same paper also deals briefly with societies in Rd where approval
regions are arbitrary convex subsets, using the Fractional Helly Theorem
from Kalai (1984) to prove for m > d the lower bound
β(k, m, d) ≥ 1−
(
1− (
k
d+1)
( md+1)
) 1
d+1
, (5.3)
where (ab) is the binomial coefficient “a choose b”. Since this bound applies
for all convex approval regions, not just boxes, and is weaker than Equa-
tion 5.2 in the d = 1 case, Berg et al. (2010) suspect it to not be the best
possible.
Berg et al. (2010) also discuss box societies inRd, and find a lower bound
on agreement proportion for the case k ≤ m ≤ 2k− 2. This case has signif-
icant agreement, an intuitively logical result because any subset of size m
must have more than half of its voters in agreement. The formal result can
be stated as
Theorem 5.1 (Berg et al. (2010)). For integers m, k ≥ 2 such that k ≤ m ≤
2k− 2, any (k, m)-agreeable box society in Rd with n ≥ m voters has a position
approved by n−m + k voters.
We can interpret this result as the lower bound
β(k, m, d) ≥ 1− m− k
n
(5.4)
for k ≤ m ≤ 2k− 2.
For these values of m, this result is best possible, as demonstrated by
considering a graph consisting of a clique of size n−m + k and m− k iso-
lated vertices. Such a graph clearly has boxicity 1, as shown in Figure 5.1
for k = 4, m = 6, and so the bound applies for all d ≥ 1.
The result does not, however, directly address societies for which m ≥
2k− 1, leaving significant room for investigation of other values.
Abrahams et al. (2010) deal with one such case, considering (2, 3)-agreeable
box societies in Rd, proving
Theorem 5.2 (Abrahams et al. (2010)). For any d ≥ 1, any (2, 3)-agreeable
d-box society has an agreement proportion of at least (2d)−1.
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Figure 5.1 A (4, 6)-agreeable graph on six vertices with agreement proportion
1− 2/6 = 2/3, with a corresponding linear society.
This result relies on a lower bound on the boxicity of graphs in terms
of their minimum degree, proven by Adiga et al. (2008). We will adapt the
proof of Theorem 5.2 to extend the result to all (k, 2k − 1)-agreeable box
societies.
5.2 Notation
For k ≥ 2, let Gk denote the set of all (k, 2k − 1)-agreeable graphs. For
d ≥ 1, let Gk,d represent the subset of Gk consisting of graphs with boxicity
at most d, and for r ≥ k, let Gk,d(r) be the subset of Gk,d consisting of graphs
with maximum clique size at most r. Similarly, let Gk(r) be the subset of Gk
consisting of graphs with maximum clique size at most r.
Note that by our definition of (k, m)-agreeability, all graphs in the above
sets must contain at least 2k − 1 vertices. Abrahams et al. (2010) do not
impose this restriction on (2, 3)-agreeability, but we do in order to avoid
the case of a society consisting of 2k− 2 voters with no agreement, which
has agreement proportion (2k− 2)−1, a value that is in many cases smaller
than the lower bound we will prove. For example, the graph consisting of
four isolated vertices is “(3, 5)-agreeable” without the size restriction, but
its agreement proportion of 1/4 is less than the lower bound of 1/2 stated
in either Equation 5.2 or Equation 5.1.
We now define ηk(r, d) to be the maximum number of vertices of any
graph in Gk,d(r), and ηk(r) as the maximum number of vertices of any graph
in Gk(r). Note that ηk(r, d) and ηk(r) as defined may be infinite, but we will
prove in Theorem 5.3 that ηk(r) is finite for all r ≥ k ≥ 2. The finiteness of
ηk(r, d) for d ≥ 1 follows from the inequalities
2k− 1 ≤ ηk(r, 1) ≤ ηk(r, 2) ≤ · · · ≤ ηk(r), (5.5)
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which follow from the inclusion relationships
Gk,1(r) ⊆ Gk,2(r) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Gk(r).
Similarly, the inclusion relationships
Gk(k) ⊆ Gk(k + 1) ⊆ Gk(k + 2) ⊆ · · ·
imply
2k− 1 ≤ ηk(k) ≤ ηk(k + 1) ≤ ηk(k + 2) ≤ · · · .
In light of this, we define ηk(k − 1) = 2k − 2, noting that any (k, 2k − 1)-
agreeable graph must contain a clique of size k, and must have more than
2k− 2 vertices.
We will show ηk(r) ≤ k(r+ 1)+ 12 (r2− r− 4) (Theorem 5.3), so Gk,d(r) is
finite for each r ≥ k and d ≥ 1. Once this finiteness is proven, we can define
ρk(r, d) to be the minimal agreement proportion for a (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable
graph with at least 2k− 1 vertices, boxicity at most d ≥ 1 and clique size at
most r ≥ k. This can be equivalently stated as
ρk(r, d) = min{ω(G)/|V(G)| | G ∈ Gk,d(r)}, (5.6)
where ω(G) is the maximum clique size and |V(G)| is the number of ver-
tices of any graph G. We note that by the finiteness of Gk,d(r), at least one
graph in Gk,d(r) has agreement proportion ρk(r, d).
5.3 Bounding Vertex Degrees
To prove that Gk,d(r) is finite, we find upper and lower bounds on the de-
grees of vertices in (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graphs in terms of their number of
vertices and clique number. For this discussion, we mostly do not worry
about the boxicity of the graphs under consideration.
For the lower bound, we rely on the fact that (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graphs
are “close” to the strong agreement case covered by Theorem 5.1. That is to
say, we can usually find subgraphs of (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graphs that are
(k, 2k− 2)-agreeable and therefore covered by Theorem 5.1, since the sub-
sets we consider to establish the agreeability condition are only one larger
in the (k, 2k− 1) case than the (k, 2k− 2) case.
We formalize these ideas to prove the following theorem.
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Lemma 5.1. For k ≥ 2, let G ∈ Gk have n ≥ 2k− 1 vertices. Then for any vertex
v of G, we have
deg(v) ≥ n−ω(G)− (k− 1),
where ω(G) is the size of the largest clique of G.
Proof. Notice that v is connected to deg(v) vertices, and let H be the sub-
graph induced by the n − deg(v) − 1 vertices of G that are neither v nor
adjacent to v.
First suppose n− deg(v)− 1 < 2k− 2. This implies
deg(v) > n− 2k + 1 = n− k− (k− 1).
Because G is (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable, ω(G) ≥ k, so
deg(v) > n−ω(G)− (k− 1).
Now suppose n − deg(v) − 1 ≥ 2k − 2. Then H must be (k, 2k − 2)-
agreeable, because otherwise we can take 2k− 2 vertices of H along with v
to create a set of 2k− 1 vertices of G that do not contain a clique of size k.
Therefore by Theorem 5.1, H must contain a clique of size
(n− deg(v)− 1)− (2k− 2) + k = n− deg(v)− (k− 1).
This implies
ω(G) ≥ ω(H) ≥ n− deg(v)− (k− 1),
and therefore
deg(v) ≥ n−ω(G)− (k− 1),
as desired.
We note that this bound is the best possible, as can be seen by consid-
ering a graph consisting of a clique of size k and k− 1 isolated vertices. In
this case the graph has n = 2k− 1 vertices, so the lower bound on degree
is 2k− 1− k− (k− 1) = 0, which is the degree of each isolated vertex. The
k = 3 case of this graph is shown in Figure 5.2.
We now prove an upper bound on the degree of vertices.
Lemma 5.2. For k ≥ 2 and r ≥ k, let G ∈ Gk,d. Then for any vertex v of G,
deg(v) ≤ ηk(r− 1, d) ≤ ηk(r− 1).
This proof is essentially identical to the proof of Abrahams et al. (2010: Lem-
ma 4.3).
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Figure 5.2 A (3, 5)-agreeable graph demonstrating the sharpness of
Lemma 5.1.
Proof. Given vertex v, let H be the subgraph induced by the neighbors of v.
If H has fewer than 2k− 1 vertices, then
deg(v) < 2k− 1 ≤ ηk(r− 1, d)
by Equation 5.5.
Otherwise H is (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable, since it is an induced subgraph of
G with at least 2k− 1 vertices, and G is (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable. Similarly, H
has boxicity at most d.
If it were the case that deg(v) > ηk(r− 1, d), then H would have a clique
of size r (by the definition of ηk(r− 1, d)), which together with v would form
a clique of size r + 1 in G, violating the assumption ω(G) ≤ r. This implies
deg(v) ≤ ηk(r− 1, d) ≤ ηk(r− 1),
with the latter inequality following from Equation 5.5.
These upper and lower bounds on degrees of vertices allow us to prove
an upper bound on ηk(r).
Theorem 5.3. For r ≥ k,
ηk(r) ≤ k(r + 1) + 12 (r
2 − r− 4).
Again this proof follows that of Abrahams et al. (2010) for a similar
result about (2, 3)-agreeable graphs.
Proof. Let G ∈ Gk(r) satisfy ω(G) = r and have ηk(r) vertices. Then by
Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2, for any vertex v of a G,
ηk(r)− r− (k− 1) ≤ deg(v) ≤ ηk(r− 1),
and thus
ηk(r)− r− (k− 1)− ηk(r− 1) ≤ 0.
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Figure 5.3 The graph G with k = 4, and a corresponding linear society.
This is a recurrence we can solve, given ηk(k− 1) = 2k− 2.
Solving the recurrence gives
ηk(r) ≤ k(r + 1) + 12 (r
2 − r− 4),
as desired.
By the definition of ηk(r), this result implies that Gk(r) is finite, and
therefore so is Gk,d(r) ⊆ Gk(r). This justifies our definition of ρk(r, d).
5.4 Bounding Minimal Agreement Proportion
Before proving a lower bound on minimal agreement proportion, we prove
a simple upper bound, which will allow us to consider only graphs that
potentially minimize agreement proportion, ignoring those with too much
agreement. For inspiration, we recall the graph constructed to demonstrate
the sharpness of Lemma 5.1 (an example of which appears in Figure 5.2),
and note that it has agreement proportion k/(2k− 1) > 1/2.
With this in mind, we prove
Lemma 5.3. For all k ≥ 2, d ≥ 1, and r ≥ k, the minimal agreement proportion
ρk(r, d) is at most 1/2.
Proof. We note Gk,1(k) ⊆ Gk,d(r) for all d ≥ 1 and r ≥ k, so it will suffice
to construct a graph with boxicity 1 and clique number k whose agreement
proportion is 1/2.
We construct the graph G consisting of two disjoint cliques of size k.
Clearly this graph has boxicity 1 and clique number k. It is shown, along
with a representation as intervals, in Figure 5.3 for k = 4.
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Notice that G has 2k vertices, so it has agreement proportion 1/2. Fur-
ther notice that any set of 2k− 1 vertices simply excludes one vertex, and
thus must include the entire clique not containing that vertex, so G is (k, 2k−
1)-agreeable. Thus G is the desired graph, proving
ρk(r, d) ≤ 12.
This result clearly shows that the graph we constructed to show the
sharpness of Lemma 5.1 does not minimize agreement proportion. In fact
it allows us to prove a stronger version of the lemma, which will prove to
be the key result for proving Equation 5.1.
Theorem 5.4. For k ≥ 2, let G ∈ Gk,d(r) have n ≥ 2k− 1 vertices and agreement
proportion ρk(r, d). Then for any vertex v of G, we have
deg(v) ≥ n−ω(G)− 1,
where ω(G) ≤ r is the size of the largest clique of G.
Proof. Let G ∈ Gk,d(r) have agreement proportion ρk(r, d), and let v be some
vertex of G.
First suppose deg(v) > k− 2, and construct a set of vertices X by first
including all vertices not adjacent to v (excluding v itself), and then choos-
ing some k− 2 neighbors of v to add to X. By this construction we have
|X| = (n− deg(v)− 1) + (k− 2) = n− deg(v) + k− 3.
If |X| < 2k− 2, then
n− deg(v) + k− 3 < 2k− 2,
which implies
deg(v) > n− k− 1 ≥ n−ω(G)− 1,
where the second inequality follows from ω(G) ≥ k. This is the desired
result.
If, on the other hand, |X| ≥ 2k− 2, let H1 be the subgraph induced by X,
and notice that H1 must be (k, 2k− 2)-agreeable. This is because any set of
2k− 2 vertices from H1 can be paired with v to create a set of 2k− 1 vertices
of G, and such a set must contain a clique of size k. The construction of
X ensures that such a clique cannot contain v, since at most k − 2 other
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vertices of the set are adjacent to v, and so the clique must be contained
within H1.
By Theorem 5.1, H1 must contain a clique of size
(n− deg(v) + k− 3)− (2k− 2) + k = n− deg(v)− 1.
Since H1 is an induced subgraph of G, this implies
ω(G) ≥ n− deg(v)− 1,
which implies
deg(v) ≥ n−ω(G)− 1,
which again is the desired result.
We are left to consider the case deg(v) ≤ k− 2. Let H2 be the subgraph
induced by all the vertices of G except for v, and note that H2 has size n− 1.
Further notice that any set of 2k − 2 vertices of H2 contains at most k − 2
vertices adjacent to v (in G), so H2 must be (k, 2k− 2)-agreeable. This again
follows from the idea that any set containing v and 2k − 2 vertices of H2
must contain a clique of size k in G, but such a clique cannot include v since
it has at most k− 2 neighbors.
By Theorem 5.1, H1 must contain a clique of size
(n− 1)− (2k− 2) + k = n− k + 1.
Since H1 is an induced subgraph of G, this implies
ω(G) ≥ n− k + 1,
so G has agreement proportion
ρk(r, d) =
ω(G)
n
≥ n− k + 1
n
= 1− k− 1
n
>
1
2
, (5.7)
where the last inequality follows from n ≥ 2k− 1. Notice, however, that by
Lemma 5.3, ρk(r, d) ≤ 1/2, so Equation 5.7 implies
1
2
≥ ρk(r, d) > 12,
which is a contradiction. Thus there are no vertices v such that deg(v) ≤
k− 2 in G, and we have considered all cases.
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We note that the bound on vertex degree in this theorem is exactly the
same for agreement proportion-minimizing (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graphs as
the one proved by Abrahams et al. (2010) for all (2, 3)-agreeable graphs.
This is good, since we are trying to prove the same lower bound on minimal
agreement proportion.
Following the method of Abrahams et al. (2010), at this point we want
to bring boxicity back in by way of a key lower bound on the boxicity of a
graph in terms of its minimum degree, proven by Adiga et al. (2008).
For a graph G on n vertices, we call a vertex universal if its degree is
n− 1.
Theorem 5.5 (Adiga et al. (2008)). Let G be a graph with no universal vertices
and minimum degree δ. Then the boxicity of G has the lower bound
box(G) ≥ n
2(n− δ− 1) .
To apply this theorem, we need to show that the graphs in consideration
do not have universal vertices.
Theorem 5.6. For k ≥ 2, let G be a (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graph on n ≥ 2k− 1
vertices with boxicity at most d ≥ 1, clique size at most r ≥ k, and agreement
proportion equal to ρk(r, d). Then G has no universal vertices.
This theorem and proof are adapted from Abrahams et al. (2010: Lemma
5.2).
Proof. Let G ∈ Gk,d(r) have n vertices with u ≥ 0 universal vertices and
agreement proportion ρk(r, d). We will prove u = 0.
First suppose
n− u < 2k− 1. (5.8)
In this case, there are a lot of universal vertices, so we will show that the
agreement proportion of G is large.
Let m = 2k − 1− (n − u), so that any set of 2k − 1 vertices of G con-
taining all vertices of H will contain exactly m universal vertices, where m
is positive by Equation 5.8. Since such a set must contain a clique of size k,
this implies
ω(H) ≥ k−m = n− u− k + 1.
From here we can see that G has agreement proportion
ρk(r, d) =
ω(G)
n
=
ω(H) + u
n
≥ (n− u− k + 1) + u
n
= 1− k− 1
n
>
1
2
,
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where the final inequality follows from the hypothesis n ≥ 2k− 1 > 2k− 2.
By Lemma 5.3, this implies
1
2
≥ ρk(r, d) > 12,
which is a contradiction.
Therefore it must be the case that n− u ≥ 2k − 1, and notice that this
implies u < n, since 2k− 1 > 0. In this case, there are fewer universal ver-
tices, so we just rely on the idea that adding universal vertices to a graph
can only increase its agreement proportion to show that the agreement pro-
portion of G is not minimal if u > 0.
Let H be the graph induced by the nonuniversal vertices of G, and note
that H has size n− u ≥ 2k− 1, so H is (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable. Further note
that box(H) ≤ box(G) ≤ d, as boxicity can only decrease when taking
induced subgraphs. For any vertex v ∈ V(H), we have
degH(v) = degG(v)− u < n− 1− u = |V(H)| − 1,
so H has no universal vertices. Finally, notice that any maximal clique in G
must contain all of the universal vertices of G, so
ω(H) = ω(G)− u.
This implies H ∈ Gk,d(r), and allows us to calculate the agreement propor-
tion for H as
ω(H)
|V(H)| =
ω(G)− u
n− u ≤
ω(G)
n
= ρk(r, d). (5.9)
But H ∈ Gk,d(r) implies H has agreement proportion at least ρk(r, d), so it
must be the case that equality holds, and so
ω(G)− u
n− u =
ω(G)
n
,
which implies u = 0, as desired.
With this theorem in hand, we can prove
Theorem 5.7. For k ≥ 2 and d ≥ 1, any (k, 2k − 1)-agreeable n-vertex graph
with boxicity at most d has agreement proportion at least (2d)−1.
Note that this result is an extension of Theorem 5.2, which is just the
k = 2 case. The proof method is identical to that used by Abrahams et al.
(2010).
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Proof. Let G be a (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable n-vertex graph with boxicity at most
d and maximum clique size r such that G has agreement proportion ρk(r, d).
By Theorem 5.6, G has no universal vertices, and so by Theorem 5.5,
d ≥ box(G) ≥ n
2(n− δ− 1) ,
where δ is the minimum degree of G. We rewrite this inequality as
n− δ− 1 ≥ n
2d
.
By Theorem 5.4,
ω(G) ≥ n− δ− 1.
These inequalities can be combined to show
ρk(r, d) =
ω(G)
n
≥ n− δ− 1
n
≥ 1
2d
.
Since by definition every (k, 2k− 1)-agreeable graph with boxicity at most
d has agreement proportion at least ρk(r, d) for some r, this implies the de-
sired result.
5.5 Discussion
The most immediate reaction to Theorem 5.7 is to note that it provides ex-
actly the same bound as Abrahams et al. (2010), for a wider range of soci-
eties. We also note that it matches the Berg et al. (2010) linear result (Equa-
tion 5.2) when d = 1.
It is important to note that this d = 1 case provides our only current
examples of equality holding in Theorem 5.7. Lemma 5.3 and its proof
imply that equality holds, with the graph consisting of two cliques of size
k serving as a convenient example of a (k, 2k − 1)-agreeable linear society
with agreement proportion 1/2.
For d = 2, Berg et al. (2010) and Abrahams et al. (2010) both refer to
examples of (2, 3)-agreeable graphs with agreement proportion 3/8, such
as the one in Figure 5.4. Since Theorem 5.7 provides a lower bound of 1/4
for this case, the lack of other examples suggests that it may be possible
to improve the bound, even in the k = 2, d = 2 case. We have found no
examples for k > 2 that show the bound to be sharp.
Since Theorem 5.7 depends on the bound of Theorem 5.5, one way to
improve the bound might be to find a new version of the boxicity bound
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Figure 5.4 A (2, 3)-agreeable graph with agreement proportion 3/8, and a
corresponding 2-box society (Abrahams et al., 2010).
Figure 5.5 The graph P4, for which equality holds in Theorem 5.5.
found by Adiga et al. (2008). This path is especially tempting since boxicity
only really enters Theorem 5.7 through that bound, but it is not immedi-
ately clear what form an altered Theorem 5.5 might take.
Adiga et al. (2008) make no explicit comment on the sharpness of the
bound
box(G) ≥ n
2(n− δ− 1) , (5.10)
but it is possible to choose values and construct graphs for which equality
holds. For example, P4, the path on four vertices, has δ = 1 and n = 4, and
boxicity 1, and 1 = 4/(2(2)).
Whether such examples remove all possibility for improving the bound
is not immediately clear.
It may also be possible to derive new bounds on β(k, m, d) from some
of the various other lower bounds on boxicity provided by Adiga et al.
(2008), but most refer to specific types of graphs. Thus applications of those
results would be limited by restriction to certain sorts of societies. With-
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out more extensive characterizations of agreement-proportion minimizing
graphs (beyond the facts proved in Theorems 5.4 and 5.6), such limitations
will be severe.
Despite our reservations that Theorem 5.7 may not be the best possi-
ble, we can confirm that it is better than Equation 5.3, the lower bound for
agreement in convex societies in Rd derived from the fractional Helly The-
orem. This is not unexpected, since requiring approval regions to be boxes
forces more intersections than general convex sets.
For the m = 2k− 1 case under consideration, Equation 5.3 becomes
β(k, 2k− 1, d) ≥ 1−
(
1− k!((2k− 1)− (d + 1))!
(2k− 1)!(k− (d + 1))!
) 1
d+1
. (5.11)
For fixed d, the limit of the right hand side as k goes to infinity is
1− (1− 2−d−1)1/(d+1),
and this limit is greater than the actual value for all k, so the bound can be
written as
β(k, 2k− 1, d) ≥ 1− (1− 2−d−1)1/(d+1).
Since (2d)−1 is greater than 1− (1− 2−d−1)1/(d+1) for all d ≥ 1, the new
bound is stronger than Equation 5.3.
To just get a sense for this, we can pick values of k and d (recalling that
Equation 5.3 applies only for d < 2k− 1).
For d = 2, we get 1/4 = 0.25 from Theorem 5.7, and the Equation 5.3
value ranges from 0 to 0.043 as k goes from 2 to 10. The limit is 1− 71/32 ≈
0.044.
For d = 10, we get 1/20 = 0.05 from Theorem 5.7, and the Equation 5.3
value ranges from 0 to 9.1× 10−6 as k goes from 6 to 20. The limit is ap-
proximately 4.4× 10−5.
These examples fit with our expectation that Theorem 5.7, which is spe-
cific to box societies, is a much stronger result than Equation 5.3.
Chapter 6
Future Work
The work of Chapter 3 leaves little in the way of open questions, as it pro-
vides a best possible lower bound on the agreement proportion of an ar-
bitrary society with a given pairwise-agreement proportion, so the most
tempting direction for future work on approval voting in box societies
seems to be in the sorts of (k, m)-agreeability questions posed in Chapter 5.
Here we present a natural conjecture that arises from that chapter, along
with some thoughts on a potential proof.
6.1 A Conjecture
As we have already noted, the lower bound on agreement proportion for
(k, 2k − 1)-agreeable d-box societies proved in Theorem 5.7 matches the
lower bound of (k− 1)/(m− 1) found by Berg et al. (2010) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m
in the linear (d = 1) case. This suggests a possible lower bound for all
(k, m)-agreeable d-box societies.
Conjecture 6.1. For d ≥ 1 and 2 ≤ k ≤ m,
β(k, m, d) ≥ k− 1
(m− 1)d .
In considering how to potentially prove Conjecture 6.1, we note that it
would be useful to prove
ω(G) ≥ 2(n− δ− 1)
(
k− 1
m− 1
)
(6.1)
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Figure 6.1 A six-vertex (2,4)-agreeable graph G with agreement proportion
1/3, and a corresponding linear society.
for (k, m)-agreeable graphs G on n vertices that minimize the agreement
proportion, where δ is the minimum degree of G. This, along with an ana-
log of Theorem 5.6 for (k, m)-agreeable graphs, would allow us to repeat
the proof of Theorem 5.7 to prove Conjecture 6.1.
However, we can show that Equation 6.1 does not hold for general
(k, m)-agreeable graphs minimizing agreement proportion. To see this, we
consider k = 2, m = 4, and note that these would convert Equation 6.1 into
δ ≥ n− 3
2
ω(G)− 1. (6.2)
We construct a graph G consisting of three pairs of adjacent vertices with
no other edges, shown in Figure 6.1.
We first note that this graph is (2, 4)-agreeable because any collection
of four vertices must contain at least two adjacent vertices. We can eas-
ily calculate that its agreement proportion is 1/3, and observe that it has
boxicity 1. Thus we can apply the Berg et al. (2010) result to see that
(2 − 1)/(4 − 1) = 1/3 and thus this graph has minimal agreement pro-
portion among (2, 4)-agreeable interval graphs.
Therefore if Equation 6.1 holds for all (k, m)-agreeable graphs on n ver-
tices that minimize the agreement proportion, it must be that Equation 6.2
holds for this particular graph G.
However, for this G we have n = 6 and ω(G) = 2, so the right hand
side of Equation 6.2 becomes 6− 3− 1 = 2, while the left hand side is 1
(since all of the vertices have degree 1). Thus Equation 6.1 does not hold
for general k, m, and d.
It may be the case that Equation 6.1 does hold for some other specific
cases, but the above example demonstrates that there is no completely gen-
eral extension of the argument of Chapter 5 to prove Conjecture 6.1.
It does, however, remain possible, and perhaps likely, that Conjecture 6.1
or even a stronger version could be proved by some alternate method, or
some special cases of the general framework used by Abrahams et al. (2010)
and Chapter 5.
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